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BILLS AND NOTES
ROBERT A, McKENNA O
Consideration and burden of proof.-Maloney v. McBrides' involved
an action by the executrix of the deceased payee of a promissory note
against the corporation maker of the note. Defendant denied consideration.
Evidence consisting of prior payment on the note of almost $7,000,
conveyance of lands by deceased to the defendant corporation, admissions,
etc., were held sufficient to establish consideration, and the decision of
the circuit court for the defendant was reversed.
Since, by the weight of authority, lack of consideration and failure of
consideration are construed to be affirmative defenses under the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law Sections 24 and 28,2 it appears surprising
that the circuit court should have reached a conclusion adverse to the
plaintiff. Jury trial was waived. The reason seems to be that the law of
negotiable instruments, with regard to the burden of proof, is not definitely
settled in Florida. In Wilson v. Maddox,3 the plea of failure of consideration
was said to place the burden on the plaintiff of establishing no failure.
On the other hand, where the instrument was in the hands of an indorsee
the burden was imposed upon the maker to prove the failure of consideration
and also the indorsee's knowledge thereofA
In the recent case of Rapp v. Demmerle,5 the court stated that the
"payee is a holder for value unless the contrary is asserted and shown."
Despite this recent statement, it would appear in Florida that where
consideration has been denied by a proper plea, the plaintiff should present
evidence thereof. In Sarasota Kennel Club v. Shea,6 the court struck
defendant's plea of no consideration as "sham," only after defendant had
failed to answer plaintiff's affidavit evidencing consideration. Certainly
Florida has not gone as far as Colorado, where the Supreme Court stated:
Sections 24 and 28 [of the Negotiable Instruments Law] impose
on the defendant who affimnatively pleads absence or failure of
consideration the burden of establishing his defense by a fair
preponderance of the evidence and that burden does not shift
to the plaintiff when the defendant has produced some evidence
in support of his defense, but it remains on the defendant
throughout the trial.7
*Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 54 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1951).
2. FL.A STAT. §§ 674.27 and 674.31; BEITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 403 et seq. (1943).
3. 97 Fla. 489, 121 So. 805 (1929).
4. Atlantic and Gulf Fertilizer Co. v. Coats, 105 Fla. 324, 141 So. 149(1932).
5. 61 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1952).
6. 56 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1952).
7. Hickman-Lumbeck Grocery Co. v. Hager, 75 Colo. 554, 227 Pac. 829 (1924).
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Seal.--Thc word "seal," typewritten after the names of the corporation
and president, co-makers of promissory notes, constituted proper seals
though no impression seal adopted by the corporation was used.8 Hence,
action on the note as a scaled instrument was not barred by the five year
statute of limitations.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law Section 6(4) 9, the validity and
negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by a seal.' 0 This
changed the general common law rule that the negotiability of an instrument
was destroyed by the presence of a seal thereon." This change is not
construed, however, as rendering a seal on a negotiable instrument a
nullity. The seal is still operative in that the statute of limitations with
regard to sealed instruments is applicable. This affirms a 1920 decision.' 2
Liability of parties.-Deceased and his wife, the beneficiary of life
insurance policies, had assigned the policies to the defendant bank "as
collateral security for all liabilities-either now existing or that may hereafter
arise" between the deceased and the assignee. In an action by the widow
to recover the proceeds of the policies the decision was for the defendant.
It was held that defendant bank had properly applied the proceeds to
deceased's obligations to the bank as co-maker, indorser before delivery
and indorser for discount of certain promissory notes.' 3 The court said
the liability of such parties was the same and the holder of the notes
might sue the one he chooses.
The decision would appear to be correct, if the last statement of
the court is not construed to mean that the liabilities of primary and
secondary parties are the same. Of course, indorsers are secondary parties
and conditions precedent to their liability are, ordinarily, due presentment
and notice of dishonor. At an carly date it was decided that an indorser,
before delivery to the payee, was liable as an indorser under the Negotiable
Instruments Act and not as maker as was formerly the law in Florida. 4
Non.delivery, conditional delivery and delivery for a special purpose.-
In Shapiro v. Hackel'3 it was held in an action on a promissory note
that the defendant's pleas alleged sufficient facts to show that delivery
of the note had been conditional or for a special purpose only, and not
for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. Hence,
defendant would win out against anyone who was not a holder in due
course. 10
8. Sarasota Kennel Club v. Shea, 56 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1952).
9. FLA. STAT. § 674.07 (1951).
10. Williams v. Peninsular Grocery Co., 73 Fla. 937, 75 So. 517 (1917).
11. lBrTToN, BILLS AND NOTES 28 (1943).
12. Grand Lodge K. of P. of Florida v. State Bank of Florida, 79 Fla. 471, 84 So.
528 (1920).
13. Sylva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, 56 So.2d 332 (FMa. 1951).
14. Baumeister v. Kuntz, 53 Fla. 340, 42 So. 886 (1907).
15. 56 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1951).
16. FLA. STAT. § 674.18 (1951), N.IL. § 16.
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When the Negotiable Instruments Law, Section 1617 states that a
conditional delivery or a delivery for a special purpose may be shown
as between immediate parties it is construed to mean that this can be
done if it does not violate the parol evidence rule. An instrument to be
negotiable must contain an unconditional promisc or order.'8 A showing,
then, of a prior or contemporaneous oral condition to the promise
necessarily is in contradiction of the written instrument and would,
therefore, seem inadmissable. Courts have, therefore, in order to prevent
the unfortunate results attendant upon a too strict application of the parol
evidence rule, distinguished between a condition precedent and a condition
subsequent. A showing of a parol condition precedent, it is held, does not
contradict the writing, but merely goes to show that the writing has not
yet come into force and effect as an obligation to pay money.' The
Shapiro case, then, is in accord with the almost uniform rule and with
prior Florida decisions 20
Negotiability.-The court in invalidating certain bonds pronounced
them non-negotiable though they expressly stated on their faces that
they "shall be and constitute negotiable instruments for all purposes under
the law merchant and the Negotiable Instrument Law of the State of
Florida."2t  A Mississippi court answered the question very succinctly by
stating that such a recital does not render the instruments negotiable "any
more than does a label on a cow reading 'This is a horse' change the
character of the animal.' 22
Right of the holder of a check against the drawee bank.-The
indorsee of a check sued the bank on which the check was drawn for
losses sustained by the plaintiff in cashing checks for the payee in reliance
upon alleged misrepresentations by defendant's employees and officers that
the drawer's account and checks were good? 3 The court found no fraud,
as at the time of the representations the drawer always had made his
checks good, and affirmed a summary judgment for the bank under the
Negotiable Instruments Law Section 18924 which provides that a bank
is not liable to a holder unless and until it accepts or certifies a check.
Ordinarily, of course, the drawee of a bill of exchange is not even
a contracting party until he becomes such by accepting or certifying
17. Ibid,
18. FLA. STAT. § 674.02 (1951), N.1.L. § 1.
19. Smith v. Botterweich, 200 N.Y. 299, 93 N.E. 985 (1911). The action
was by the payee against the maker of a promissory note and the defendant was
permitted to show non-performance of a parol condition precedent to the existence
of the contract to pay money. The case distinguishes a prior case in which the
condition was a condition subsequent, evidence of which was excluded.
20. Cockrell v. Taylor, 122 Fla. 798, 165 So. 887 (1936); Anderson v. Ax, 104 Fla.
294, 139 So. 798 (1932).
21. Chase v. City of Sanford, 54 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1951).
22. Moore v. Vaughn, 167 Miss. 758, 150 So. 372 (1933).
23. Gartner v. American Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 58 So.2d 705 (Fla. 1952).
24. FLA. STAT. § 676.52 (1951).
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the instrument. This rule is codified in the case of checks by the above
cited section of the Negotiable Instruments Law. However, by the weight
of authority, a holder whose check has been paid by the drawee bank to
another person under the holder's forged indorsement can recover from
the bank on the theory of conversion.29 Florida so holds.26
Holder in due eourse.-The plaintiff company sued on a promissory
note signed by defendant purchasers of a deep freeze and a meat saw. 2t
The conditional sales agreement and the note were assigned and indorsed
to the plaintiff by the payee seller the day following the transaction. The
defendant claims failure of consideration in that the freezer was valueless
for the purposes for which it was sold. It is the contention of the
plaintiff that he is a holder in due course and, therefore, this personal
defense is not available against him. In holding for the defendant, the
court said, the plaintiff was so closely connected with the entire transaction
as to be to all intents and purposes a party to the agreement, and not
an innocent purchaser in good faith under Sections 52, 56 and 57.28
In practically all case or text books concerned with bills and notes
there is a section devoted to the consideration of the payee as a holder
in due course. The great weight of authority holds that a payee can be a
holder in due course in those situations where he is in fact insulated from
the maker or drawer by a third party such as an agent of the maker
or drawer; i.e., where he is not really an immediate party though he looks
to be so on the face of the instrument.29  In the principal case, supra,30
we are dealing with the converse of this situation. The plaintiff indorsee
would appear from the instrument to be a remote party, but is treated
by the court as an immediate one, in privity with the maker. The
decision, which is based largely on an Arkansas holding 31 involving much
the same set of facts, would seem sound. In this day and age when a
finance company, instead of the seller, takes the credit risk for a large
percentage of the sellers of expensive articles, it should be subjected to
any defenses which the purchaser may have as against the seller. Otherwise
the buyer is deprived of his right under sales law to repudiate the
transaction for cause and get his money and notes back. His right to
damages from the seller is not satisfactory, particularly where the seller is
insolvent.
Fraud in the inception or execution of negotiable instruments and
negligence.-The defendant, a secretary and receptionist, claims she was
induced to indorse two promissory notes by the fraudulent act of her
25. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 681 (1943).
26. Lewis State Bank v. Raker, 138 Fla. 227, 189 So. 227 (1939); Louisville &
N. R. R. v. Citizens & Peoples Nat. Bank of Pensacola, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917).
27. Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
28. FLA. STAT. §§ 674.54, 674.58 and 674.59 (1951).
29. BRITrON, BILLS AND NOTES 508 (1943).
30. See note 27 supra.
31. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
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employer in asking her to sign two blank pieces of paper which, unknowu
to her, were the backs of two promissory notes payable to her. It was
conceded that the plaintiff, a holder in due course, could not recover
if the defendant was free from negligence, but the court held that the
evidence was not sufficient to indicate lack of negligence. The court
assumed that negligence in this situation practically speaks for itself as
far as the "intelligent, informed and literate" are concerned; therefore,
the judgment was for the plaintiff.3 2
At common law, a clear distinction existed, by the weight of authority,
between fraud "in the inducement" and fraud "in the inception or
execution." The former covered the case where the contracting party
knew he was signing a negotiable instrument, but was fraudulently induced
o do so. This type of fraud was generally held to give rise to a personal
defense available as between immediate parties, but not good as against
a bona fide purchaser of the instrument for value and before maturity, a
holder in due course. However, if the fraud practiced was of such kind
that the signer of a negotiable instrument did not know that he was
entering into a contract to pay money, but thought he was merely signing
a receipt or some other instrument of entirely different character, he was,
by the weight of authority, held to have a real defense good even as
against a holder in due course, if the signer was not negligent. 33 The theory,
of course, was that there can be no contract without any intent to enter
into one, unless the signer's negligence should preclude him from denying
such intent. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law Sections 55 and 57,31
the "obtaining" of a negotiable instrument by fraud constitutes a personal
defense not available as against a holder in due course. The statute, however,
makes no distinction between the two types of fraud, and there is no
Florida case either before or since the Negotiable Instruments Law directly
on point. It can easily be argued that the legislative intent was to abolish
the distinction if it existed at common law "3 5 or to avoid it if not already
established in Florida. Evidently, in the principal case, supra36 , the
attorney for the plaintiff was so confident (and justifiably so) that the
facts established negligence, he considered it unnecessary to contend that
the defendant would have only a personal defense even though not
negligent. The result is" that there is no case in Florida directly holding
that "fraud in the inception or execution" is a real defense in the absence
of negligence. It would appear, however, that Florida probably would so
hold, in accordance with the weight of authority both now and before
the Negotiable Instrument Law.37
32. Levinson v. Frunkes, 64 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1953).
33. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTEs 566 (1943).
34. FLA. STAT. §§ 674.57 and 674.59 (1951).
35. C.I.T. Corp. v. Panac, 149 P.2d 901, rev'd, 25 CaL2d 547, 154 P.2d 710 (1944).
36. See note 32 supra.
37. See note 33 supra.
